In the original round-robin differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) quantum key distribution and its improved method, the photon-number-resolving detectors are must for the security. We present a RRDPS protocol with yes-no detectors only. We get the upper bounds of mutual information of Alice and Eve, and Bob and Eve, and the formula of key rate. Our main idea is to divide all counts into two classes, the counts due to the odd number of photons incident to the detectors and the counts due to the even number photons incident to the detectors. The fact that the bit-flip error rate of the later class is certainly 50% makes it possible for us to perform a tightened estimation of the upper bound of the leakage information. The robustness of original RRDPS against source flaws such as side-channel attacks still holds for the RRDPS with yes-no detectors. The simulation results show that the key rate of RRDPS with yes-no detectors is close to that of RRDPS with photon-number-resolving detectors. Our results make the RRDPS protocol much more practical.
Introduction Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a information-theoretical secure key distribution method between two parties, Alice and Bob, and the security is based on the laws of quantum physics. Since Bennett and Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol [1] , BB84 protocol, many new QKD protocols [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] and improved methods [13] [14] [15] have been proposed to assure the security with imperfect devices and improve the key rate. The key of those QKD's security is that any eavesdropping of Eve would introduce disturbances, and we could evaluate the upper bound of leakage information according the disturbances. Surprisingly, a QKD protocol named round robin differential phase shift ((RRDPS)) QKD protocol [16] was proposed in which the leakage information could be evaluated without monitoring any signal disturbance. This is so remarkable that has attracted many attentions [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Not only has it greatly simplified to realization in practice because there is no bases-switching, but also improved the security in side-channel aspect [20] . Notabaly, Yin et al. [21] proposed a tighter upper bound of leakage information and greatly improved the key rate especially with small L compared with the original RRDPS.
The detectors used in original RRDPS [16, 21, 22] are photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors.This limits the practical application of RRDPS. Thus it is crucially important to study the RRDPS protocol with yes-no detectors only. Here we propose such a RRDPS protocol. Our main idea is to divide all counts into two classes, the counts due to the odd number photons incident to the detectors and the counts due to the even number photons incident to the detectors. The fact that the bit-flip error rate of the later class is certainly 50% makes it possible for us to perform a tightened estimation of the upper bound of the leakage information.
This paper is arranged as follows. We first introduce the original RRDPS protocol. We then present the main results of the upper bound of leakage information and the formula of key rate of RRDPS with yes-no detectors. After that, we present some numerical results of RRDPS with yes-no detectors and compare with RRDPS with PNR detectors. The article ends with some concluding remarks. Main Results As shown in Figure. 3, in the original RRDPS protocol [16] , the communication parties are Alice and Bob. Alice first prepares a train of L pulses and randomly modulates their phases into 0 or π. If Alice's source is single-photon source, she will finally prepare the state as
where |i denotes there is one photon in the ith pulse and k i is randomly 1 or 0. If Alice's source is weak coherent state source, the final state she prepares is
where |α denotes there is a weak coherent state pulse with intensity |α| 2 in location i. Then Alice sends this L-pulses train to Bob, and Bob performs interference measurement to the incoming pulses with the set-up shown in Figure. 3.
FIG. 1:
Alice first prepares a train of L pulses and randomly modulates their phases into 0 or π and sends this pulses to Bob. Bob performs interference measurement to the incoming pulses with the set-up above. In this set-up, the two detectors are PNR detectors and the delay module will randomly produce r(r ∈ [1, L − 1]) delay. If only one detector response one time in the whole detection process, we call this L-pulses train caused a count and Alice and Bob will record the corresponding bit as the sifted key.
In this set-up, the two detectors are PNR detectors and the delay module will randomly produce r(r ∈ [1, L − 1]) delay. If only one detector responses one time in the whole detection process, we call this L-pulses train causes a count and Bob will announce the detection result {a, b}, b = a + r(mod L) to Alice through a public channel. Bob records the measured phase difference as his sifted key bit S B and Alice records S A = k a ⊕ k b as her sifted key bit.
In the original RRDPS protocol, to evaluate the maximum leakage information, the PNR detectors are needed [16, 21, 22] , or else the formula of key rate will no longer hold. But as so far, the technology of PNR detectors are difficult. Here we study the maximum leakage information and key rate formula if the two detectors are yes-no detectors in Figure. 3. We take the single photon case as an example to briefly introduce our conclusions, and the other cases and detailed proof is shown in Supplementary materials.
Inspired by Ref. [21] , Eve's optimal collective attack can be given by the following equation if Alice prepares her state as Eq. (22):
where |e 000 is the initial state of Eve's ancilla bits; |e ijn is the final state of Eve's ancilla state after attacking and |n j represents there are n photons in the jth pulse. The coefficient c ijn satisfies
While considering the leakage information, only the states of n = 1 work if the detectors are PNR detectors, and this is just the case of Ref. [21] . But if the detectors are yes-no detectors, we have to take all the n > 0 states into consideration.
Consider the mutual information of Alice and Eve, I AE , we have that the state of Alice and Eve after Eve's attacking is
If Bob measures such an incoming state and announces {a, b}, the density matrix (non-normallized) of Eve's ancilla bits will be [23] 
where P (|x ) ≡ |x x| and c ijn ≡ c ijn |e ijn . The first part of Eq. (27) is caused by detector D 1 , and the second part is caused by detector D 2 . We find that the upper bounds of I AE corresponding to n = 1, 3, 5, . . . and n = 2, 4, 6, . . . are totally different. Here we call the counting events of n = 1, 3, 5, . . . as odd-counts and the counting events of n = 2, 4, 6, . . . as even-counts.
If the single photon pulses train causes an odd-count, the density matrix of Eve is
The value of k i (i = a, b) is randomly 0 or 1, thus we can average ρ Odd E with random k i (i = a, b) to simplify the calculation. Without compromising the security, we can assume e ijn |e klm = δ ik δ jl δ nm .
Finally only the states P [
2 n ] accounts for the Holevo bound which measures the maximum mutual information of two parties if they share a system in quantum information. Thus we can get the upper bound of
where ϕ(x, y) = −x log 2 x − y log 2 y + (x + y) log 2 (x + y) and x 1 + x 2 = 1. Note that the assumption of Eq. (34) would certainly introduce 50% bit-flip error rate, thus Eq. (8) shows that the maximum leakage information of odd-counts is limited even if Eve's attack is optimal and introduces 50% bit-flip error rate. And in general case,
is the upper bound of leakage information proposed in original RRDPS [16] .
In Supplementary materials, we prove that if the single photon pulses train causes an even-count, the upper bound of I Even AE equals 1. Dose this mean that we can not extract any secure final keys if we don't know whether the counts is an odd-count or even-count? Luckily, the answer is no. We next consider the mutual information of Bob and Eve, I BE . If the count {a, b} is detected by D 1 , the density matrix of Eve is
If the count {a, b} is detected by D 2 , the density matrix of Eve is
From Eqs. (52) and (55), it is easy to see that ρ 
where
and N +1 k=1 x k = 1. And I Even AE = 1, I
odd BE = 1. In short, I. If the train causes an odd-count, the maximum mutual information of Alice and Eve is φ(N, L), but the maximum mutual information of Bob and Eve is 1. II. If the train causes an even-count, the maximum mutual information of Bob and Eve is 0, but the maximum mutual information of Alice and Eve is 1. This means if the final counts contain many odd-counts, the mutual information of Alice and Eve is relatively small while the mutual information of Bob and Eve is pretty large, and vice versa. Thus if the error correction step is based on Alice's or Bob's sifted raw key bits, the final key bits we extract must be zero, since we have no idea about the ratio of odd-counts or even-counts. But if the sifted raw key bits are randomly split into two parts, the first part accounts for γ, and the second part accounts for 1 − γ. The error correction of the first part is based on Alice's sifted raw key bits and the second part is based on Bob's sifted raw key bits. The final key rate is
And in general case, at least one of I AB − I AE and I AB − I BE is greater than zero. If Alice's source is weak coherent state source, and she randomly modulates the mutual phase the different pulses in the train, the state that she prepares is equivalent to the classical mixture of different photon numbers. And the density matrix of the pulses train with intensity µ in photon number space is
We denote the total counting rate and error rate of the L-pulses train are Q and E, and the counting rate and error rate of k-photons L-pulses train are Y k and e k , in which the ratio of odd-counts is α k and even-counts is β k = 1 − α k , we have
where e src = n>n th a n and α + β = 1. We use a fact in the last step of Eq. (15) n th n=0 a n Y n α n + n th n=0 a n Y n β n = n th n=0 a n Y n ≥ Q − e src .
And similarly we have
Here the n th is the boundary of tagged photons (n > n th ) and untagged photons (n ≥ n th ) and will be an optimized parameters in the simulation parts to get a better key rate. The Eqs. (52) and (55) show us an important fact that if a single photon count is an even-count, its bit-flip error rate definitely is 1/2, whether Eve attacks it or not. This is different from the case of odd-counts, where the bit-flip error rate is 1/2 only if Eve attacks all the key bits with his optimal attack strategy. And we show that this fact holds for any k−photon counts in Supplementary materials. In fact, we can assume Eve's attacks introduce e odd k bit-flip error rate of the odd-counts, and we have
which implies β k ≤ 2e k . Thus we have β(Q − e src ) ≤ 2EQ, which implies
if Q − e src > 0. Combine Eqs. (13)- (16) and we could get the final key rate with observable values of experiment. Finally, we have the following formulas of final key rate TABLE II: List of optimal parameters and the corresponding key rate in different miallignment-error probability, E d . Here, we set the distance between Alice and Bob is 100 km, and µ: the intensity of the phase-randomized weak coherent state pulses train; αmin: the min value of α constrained by Eq. (18); α best : the optimal value of α according to our optimized algorithm; γ: the accounts of the part that the error correction is based on Alice's data, and defined in Eq. (13); L: the length of the pulses train; n th : the boundary of tagged and untagged photons; R: the final key rate.
Numerical Simulation We then show some numerical results and compare with the results of RRDPS with PNR detectors [21] . To clearly show the advantage of our method, we assume the properties of Bob's yes-no detectors and PNR detectors including the repetitive rate, detection efficiency and dark counting rate, are the same. Besides, we assume the PNR detectors could discriminate the single photon from zero, two or more photons perfectly. The performance parameters of the detectors and other experiment devices are list in Table. I. We use the linear model to simulate the observed values of the counting rate, Q, and error rate, E, of the L-pulses train, and the detailed of our numerical simulation method are shown in the Supplementary materials. We list some optimal parameters and their corresponding key rate under different misalignment-error probability, E d , in Table. II. Here we set the distance between Alice and Bob is 100 km. The data in Table. II show that the while E d = 1.5%, 3.0%, 6.0%, 10.0%, optimal γ = 1 and α best = α min , where α min is the min value of α constrained by Eq. (18) and α best is the optimal value of α according to our optimized algorithm. This implies that we can always The key rates of the original RRDPS with PNR detectors and our protocol with yes-no detectors versus the distance between Alice and Bob. The green line is the decent degree of the RRDPS with yes-no detectors compared with the key rate of RRDPS with PNR detectors. Here we set the misalignment-error probability, E d , as 1.5%.
set γ = 1 and α = 1 − 2EQ Q−esrc in the key rate formula of Eq. (85). Besides, we have the following fact that:
where α is in the range constrained by Eq. (85). Thus without comprising the security, we can rewrite the formula of key rate in Eq. (85) as
And in general case, the key rate calculated by Eq. (20) is the same as Eq. (85) with the same experiment conditions. Fig. 2 shows the key rates of the original RRDPS with PNR detectors and our protocol with yes-no detectors versus the distance between Alice and Bob, where we set the misalignment-error probability, E d , as 0.015. The blue solid line is the results of RRDPS with PNR detectors and the red dashed line is the results of RRDPS with yes-no detectors. Those two line is almost overlapped except the tail of the lines. The green solid line is the decent degree of the RRDPS with yes-no detectors compared with the key rate of RRDPS with PNR detectors, which clearly shows that their key rates differ less than 10% with the distance of Alice and Bob range in 0 − 175 km. This results are intuitive since the formula of key rate with PNR detectors proposed in Ref. [21] is
The only difference between Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) is the coefficient, 1 − 2E, of Q. Thus the results of RRDPS with yes-no detectors and PNR detectors are almost the same if the bit-flip error rate E is small. Conclusion We present a protocol for RRDPS with yes-no detectors and the upper bounds of mutual information of Alice and Eve, and Bob and Eve as shown in Eq. (11). We present the formula of key rate of RRDPS with yes-no detectors by Eqs. (85) and (20) . Our main idea is to divide all counts into two classes, the counts due to the odd number photons incident to the detectors and the counts due to the even number photons incident to the detectors. The fact that the bit-flip error rate of the later class is certainly 50% makes it possible for us to perform a tightened estimation of the upper bound of the leakage information. The major advantages of the original RRDPS protocol, the realization simplicity without bases switching and the source side-channel-free property hold in our protocol. The simulation results show that the key rate of RRDPS with yes-no detectors is close to that of RRDPS with PNR detectors.
I. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS II. THE UPPER BOUND OF LEAKAGE INFORMATION IN THE SINGLE-PHOTON CASE
As shown in Figure. 3, Alice first prepares a train of L pulses and randomly modulate their phases. If Alice's source is single-photon source, the state she finally prepares is
where |i denotes there is one photon in the ith pulse and k i is randomly 1 or 0. Inspired by the method of evaluating the upper boung of leakage information in Ref. [21] , Eve's optimal collective attack can be given by the following equation for the state shown in Eq. (22):
where |e 000 is the initial state of Eve's ancilla bits; |e ijn is the final state of Eve's ancilla bits after attacking and |n j denotes there are n photons in location j. The coefficient c ijn satisfies ∞ n=0 L j=1 |c ijn | 2 = 1. After Eve's attacking, the state of Alice and Eve (unnormalized) is Through Bob's detection set-up, the state of Eq. (24) is involved into
where c ijn ≡ c ijn |e ijn and r is randomly chosen from 1, 2, . . . , L − 1.
A. The mutual information of Alice and Eve
We first consider the upper bound of mutual information of Alice and Eve, I AE . If only one of Bob's detectors responses in location k, then only the states with superscript j = k − r or j = k account. We denote a = k − r and b = k, the density matrix of Eve's ancilla bits is
where P (|x ) ≡ |x x|. The first part of Eq. (27) is caused by detector D 1 , and the second part is caused by detector D 2 . We find that the upper bounds of I AE for the case n = 1, 3, 5, . . . or n = 2, 4, 6, . . . are totally different. Here we call the counting event of n = 1, 3, 5, . . . as odd-count and the counting event of n = 2, 4, 6, . . . as even-count.
The mutual information of Alice and Eve with odd-count
The value of k i , (i = a, b) is randomly 0 or 1, thus we can average ρ
Odd E
with random k i , (i = a, b) to simplify the calculation. We denote
and then we have
The mutual information of Alice and Eve if Bob announce {a, b}, I
a,b AE , could be calculated by the Holevo bound
Without compromising the security [21] , we can assume
Then we could get the upper bound of I 
ϕ(x, y) = −xlog 2 x − ylog 2 (y) + (x + y)log 2 (x + y)
If we denote p 4 n , with the concavity of ϕ(x, y) and Jensens inequality, we have
The Eq. (38) is the same as Eq. (7) of the security proof in the single-photon case of Ref. [21] . The upper bound of
(L−1)(x1+x2) for all x 1 > 0 and x 2 > 0, we could get the upper bound of I Odd AE .
The mutual information of Alice and Eve with even-count
In this part, we want to prove that if the single-photon pulses train causes an even-count, Eve will have all information of Alice's raw key bits. Or in other word, the supremum of I Even AE equals 1. According to Eq. (27), if n is an even number, the density matrix of Eve's ancilla bits will be
We set c ijn = 0 if n = 2 or i = j, and c ii2 = c. Then ρ E will be the following simple form
If k a ⊕ k b = 1,
where Q ab = 
The only inequality we use here is Holevo bound, thus the supremum of I Even AE equals 1.
The mutual information of Bob and Eve
If the single photon pulses train causes a count in detector D 1 , the density matrix of Eve is
If the single photon pulses train causes a count in detector D 2 , the density matrix of Eve is
It is easy to see that ρ 
If we set c ijn = 0 if n = 1 or i = j, and c ii1 = c, ρ D1 E and ρ D2 E will be
Since the states of ρ 
III. THE UPPER BOUND OF LEAKAGE INFORMATION IN GENERAL CASE
In this part we want to evaluate the upper bound of leakage information in general case. We have shown that if the single-photon pulses train causes an even-count, the mutual information of Alice and Eve is up to 1, and if the single-photon pulses train causes an odd-count, the mutual information of Bob and Eve is up to 1. Honestly speaking, this is a trivial conclusion, thus we will focus on the upper bounds of mutual information of Alice and Eve if the pulses train causes an odd-count and the mutual information of Bob and Eve if the pulses train causes an even-count. Same as the method in Ref. [21] , we will prove this in two cases, N is an odd number and N is an even number, where N denotes Alice sends out a N -photons L-pulses train. We assume N ≤ L/2 in this part.
A. The upper bound of leakage information if N is an odd number
If Alice prepares a N -photon L-pulses train where N is an odd number, the state will be
where |i 1 i 2 i 3 · · · i k represents a sum of all states that there are odd number photons in the i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , . . . , i k -th pulses and there are even number photons in the other pulses of the L-pulses train, for k = 1, 3, 5, . . . , N . Eve's optimal collective attack can be given by the following equation for the state shown in Eq. (52):
and we denote
for k = 1, 3, 5, . . . , N . Then Alice and Eve will share the following entanglement state
Further, we denote
Through Bob's detection set-up, the state of Eq. (55) is involved into
If only one of Bob's detectors responses in location k and we denote a = k − r, b = k, the density matrix of Eve's ancilla bits is
The first part of Eq. (60) is caused by detector D 1 , and the second part is caused by detector D 2 . It is easy to see that those two parts are the same if n is an even and thus I Even BE (N )=0. If n is odd, we have the following consideration to evaluate the upper bound of mutual information of Alice and Eve.
We first transform P ( c an ) and P ( c bn ) into
The value of k i , (i = a, b) is randomly 0 or 1, thus we have
Similarly, P ( c bn ) could be transformed into the following form
We denote ρ E as ρ 
And the upper bound of I AE is
where k = 1, 3, 5, . . . , N . And we define
With the concavity of ϕ(x, y) and Jensens inequality, we have
By searching the maximum value of Eq. (68) in non-negative spaces,we could get the upper bound of I AE .
B. The upper bound of leakage information if N is an even number
If Alice prepares a N -photon L-pulses train where N is an even number, the state will be
where |i 1 i 2 i 3 · · · i k represents a sum of all states that there are odd number photons in the i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , . . . , i k -th pulses and there are even number photons in the other pulses of the L-pulses train, for k = 2, 4, 6, . . . , N . And |i 1 represents a sum of all states that there are only even number photons in any pulse. Similarly to Eqs. (53) and (54), Eve's optimal collective attack is
for k = 1, 2, 4, 6, . . . , N . And similarly to Eqs. (55)-(60), if only one of Bob's detectors responses in location k and we denote a = k − r, b = k, the density matrix of Eve's ancilla bits is
The first part of Eq. (71) is caused by detector D 1 , and the second part is caused by detector D 2 . It is easy to see that those two parts are the same if n is even and thus I Even BE (N )=0. If n is odd, we have the following consideration to evaluate the upper bound of mutual information of Alice and Eve.
Similarly, 
where 
IV. THE SIMULATION MODEL OF RRDPS WITH SINGLE PHOTON DETECTORS
If Alice prepares the L-pulses trains with phase-randomized weak coherent state source with intensity µ and Bob's detectors are single photon detectors in RRDPS, the counting rate and error counting rate [21] are
And the error rate is E µ = T µ /Q µ . The final key rate of RRDPS with single photon detectors is LR = Q µ (1 − f H(E µ )) − e src − (Q − e src )φ(n th , L),
where e src = k>n th 
and N +1 k=1 x k = 1.
V. THE SIMULATION MODELS OF RRDPS WITH YES-NO DETECTORS
If Alice prepares the L-pulses trains with phase-randomized weak coherent state source with intensity µ and Bob's detectors are single photon detectors in RRDPS, the counting rate and error counting rate are
Eqs. (60) and (71) 
